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This paper studies the intergenerational persistence of work hours. In par-
ticular, I look at the correlation of hours between fathers and sons in the U.S.
Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, I ¯nd a strong persis-
tence in the permanent component of hours worked. I investigate the extent
this correlation is explained by (i) persistence in wages, (ii) correlation in leisure
preferences, and (iii) intergenerational wealth transfers. I also examine the role
of work e®ort in the transmission of earnings across generations. To this end, I
provide a quantitative model of intergenerational transmission of human capital
and wealth. I ¯nd that the observed persistence in hours is mostly explained by
the intergenerational correlation of leisure preferences. Moreover, the latter also
plays an important role in accounting for the similarities in earnings between
parents and children. However, the transmission of wages across generations
explains a larger fraction of the earnings dynamics.
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11 Introduction
There is a large literature on intergenerational socioeconomic mobility and persistence
in economic status.1 This literature mainly focuses on the intergenerational transmis-
sion of family income, earnings and wages. In contrast, few studies have looked at the
correlation of work hours across generations.2 To fully understand social mobility, we
must also understand how work e®ort is transmitted from parents to children. After
all, work hours is a fundamental determinant of earnings.
I examine the intergenerational persistence of work hours and ¯nd evidence that
there exists a strong positive father-son correlation. That is, fathers that work more
hours than their cohort's average tend to have children that also work more hours
than their cohort's average. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID),
I estimate a statistically signi¯cant intergenerational correlation in the permanent
component of the logarithm of annual hours of about 0.20 in the U.S. Other estimates
found in the literature, although not directly comparable with mine, also indicate a
signi¯cative positive correlation. Altonji and Dunn (1991) ¯nd an estimate of 0.19
using time averages of log annual hours reported on the National Longitudinal Surveys
of Labor Market Experience (NLS). Using the PSID, Mulligan (1997b) reports an
estimate of 0.25 using average weekly work hours, and Couch and Dunn (1997) ¯nd a
regression coe±cient of 0.14 when regressing single-year annual hours of work on six-
year averages of fathers' annual hours. The main purpose of this paper is to explain
this pattern.
Notice that a signi¯cant positive intergenerational correlation in hours is not nec-
essarily a clear-cut prediction that emerges from the theory. Consider a model of
intergenerational transmission of human capital and wealth. It is plausible that chil-
dren of relatively hard working parents will work much less due to the negative wealth
e®ect on hours caused by parental wealth transfers in the form of both bequest and
inter vivos transfers. However, these children will also tend to receive more education,
have better wages and, therefore, work more than average. In addition, if we assume
that preferences for leisure are su±ciently positively correlated across generations,
it is possible to observe a signi¯cant positive correlation of work hours between fa-
thers and sons. Indeed, I ¯nd empirical evidence that suggests a signi¯cant positive
father-son correlation of leisure preferences. The question is what drives the observed
correlation in hours across generations: preferences, wages or wealth transfers.
Another important related question posed by Altonji and Dunn (1991) is: \Is the
link between the economic success of fathers and sons primarily due to work e®ort or
to wage levels?" In other words, what role does this intergenerational linkage in work
hours play in the observed transmission of earnings across generations? I address
these questions by providing a quantitative model of intergenerational transmission
of human capital and wealth to explain the persistence of hours, wages and earnings.
Identifying the importance of each source of intergenerational persistence is important
for designing and implementing e®ective public policies to increase socioeconomic
1See Solon (1999) for an extensive survey on this topic.
2See, for example, Altonji and Dunn (1991, 2000), Couch and Dunn (1997), and Mulligan (1997b).
2mobility in a society.
The ¯rst main ¯nding of this paper is that the transmission of leisure prefer-
ences from parents to children is fundamental to account for the intergenerational
persistence of work hours. In fact, a reasonably calibrated model of wealth and wage
transmission across generations with no correlation in leisure tastes, or alternatively
no preference heterogeneity, counterfactually predicts a negative father-son correla-
tion in hours. Furthermore, similarities in work preferences along family lines seem
to be more important than the transmission of human capital or wages in order to
explain the intergenerational hours dynamics.
A related interesting result is that the persistence of earnings across generations
also depends importantly on the transmission of work preferences from parents to
children. However, the father-son wage correlation seems to explain a larger fraction
of the observed similarities in earnings.
These ¯ndings are consistent with the results of Altonji and Dunn (2000) who
specify a statistical factor model to measure the e®ects of parental and sibling wage
and work preferences on the wages, hours, and earnings of young individuals. Using
data from the NLS, they ¯nd that family linkages in preferences account for nearly
all of the similarities in work hours among family members. They also ¯nd that the
covariance in the earnings of fathers and sons is mostly explained by parental wage
factors.
The model presented in this paper also has implications on individuals' consump-
tion, arguably a more accurate measure of economic well-being. Even though con-
sumption is not the central focus of this study, I look at its correlation across genera-
tions and compare it to what is observed in the data. The benchmark model predicts
a much stronger intergenerational persistence of consumption than of earnings, wages,
and hours. This result is consistent with the empirical evidence shown here and in
previous studies.3 I ¯nd that the correlation in consumption is mainly driven by the
transmission of wealth from parents to children. Indeed, I show that in a model with
no wealth transfers, the intergenerational persistence of consumption mimics that of
earnings.
The paper is organized as follows. I ¯rst outline the model economy in Section
2, which is then employed for the empirical investigation in Section 3. There I show
evidence on the correlation of hours worked and preferences for leisure between fathers
and sons in the U.S. I also revisit the empirical evidence on the intergenerational
persistence of wages, earnings and consumption, and explore the role of education on
the transmission of human capital across generations. In Section 4 I will proceed to
calibrate the model. Next, I report the results of simulations of the model economy
in Section 5, and perform sensitivity analysis in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 presents
the concluding remarks.
3See Mulligan (1997a) and Aughinbaugh (2000) for comparative estimates of the intergenerational
correlation of consumption and earnings.
32 The economy
There are a number of potential channels for explaining the intergenerational corre-
lation of socioeconomic status and labor market outcomes. One obvious channel, on
which much of the literature has focused, is human capital investment and persistence
in skills. I therefore incorporate those elements in the model economy considered here.
Another relevant and intuitive source of correlation across generations, that I also in-
clude in the model, is wealth transfers from parents to children (bequest, inter-vivos
transfers, etc.). In addition, it is common to hear someone say that a person comes
from a family of hard workers. That motivates my additional channel: the inter-
generational transmission of work preference, for which I present empirical evidence
below.
Environment. I consider a discrete-time overlapping generation (OLG) economy
where individuals live for two periods. In their ¯rst period of life they are children,
while in the second they are adults. When agents become adults, they have one child
with whom they form a household that lasts one period. Since each adult has only one
o®spring, population does not grow. Thus, at each period t 2 f0;1;2;:::g, the econ-
omy is populated by a continuum of households with constant measure normalized
to one.
Children do not make any decisions. However, they receive education level e
chosen by their parent. The education level can be either low (el) or high (eh). Let
E = fel;ehg denote the set of possible education levels.
Each adult is endowed with one unit of time available for work and h e±ciency
units of human capital.4 Productivity can either be low (h) or high (¹ h). De¯ne
H = fh;¹ hg. Each individual's productivity depends on his education level and his
parent's human capital. In particular, it follows a conditional Markov process with
transition probabilities ¼(h0jh;e) = Pr(ht+1 = h0jht = h;et = e) for h;h0 2 H and
e 2 E. Let ¼(¹ hjh;eh) > ¼(¹ hjh;el) and ¼(hjh;el) > ¼(hjh;eh) for all h 2 H. Let ¦e,
e 2 E, denote the transition matrix associated with the above conditional transition
probabilities.
Every adult also draws a leisure preference parameter µ 2 £, where £ = fµl;µhg
with µh > µl ¸ 0. Each individual's µ is a function only of his father's leisure prefer-
ence parameter according to a stationary Markov process with transition probabilities
p(µ0jµ) = Pr(µt+1 = µ0jµt = µ) for µ;µ0 2 £. De¯ne ¡ as the transition matrix given
by p(µ0jµ).
Agents know their productivity h and preference parameter µ when they become
adults. Therefore, parents face idiosyncratic uncertainty about their child's human
capital and leisure preference.
Technology. For simplicity, I abstract from physical capital accumulation. Parents
however may save and leave bequest b through a linear storage technology which yields
exogenous gross return ½ > 0. Thus, a parent who wants his child to have ½b0 goods
next period must leave bequest b0. Intergenerational wealth transfers must always be
nonnegative, b ¸ 0.
4I will refer to h as human capital, ability or productivity interchangeably.
4There is one consumption good in this economy produced with a linear technol-
ogy that only requires labor services. Output is produced according to production
function,
F(N) = »N; » > 0;
where N are e±ciency units of labor services.
Preferences. Each period-t adult has preferences de¯ned over household consump-







; ¾ > 1; ° < 0:
Moreover, each parent is altruistic towards his child and so his utility depends on
the stochastic processes for future generations' consumption ~ ct+1 and leisure ~ lt+1.
Let U(~ ct;~ lt) denote the period-t parent's utility function, where ~ ct = (ct;~ ct+1) and
~ lt = (lt;~ lt+1). I assume that U can be represented recursively as
U(~ ct;~ lt) = uµ(ct;lt) + ¯EU(~ ct+1;~ lt+1); ¯ 2 (0;1): (1)
Individual's problem. All household decisions are made by adult individuals.
Adults may di®er in their labor productivity, leisure preferences, and initial wealth.
Thus, an adult's state is given by vector x 2 X, x = (h;µ;b). Let X = H£££[0;1)
be the adult individual state space. Parents choose household consumption, their la-
bor supply, intergenerational wealth transfers, and their child's education. That is,
each parent chooses vector (c;l;e;b0), with c ¸ 0 and l 2 [0;1].
An adult with human capital h that spends a fraction (1 ¡ l) of his time working
on the market, supplies h(1¡l) e±ciency units of labor to the labor market and earns
!h(1 ¡ l) units of the consumption good, where ! > 0 is the market e±ciency-unit
wage rate.
Providing higher education to one's children is costly. Parents must pay ¿ units
of the consumption good to provide a high level of education eh. Education level el
is costless. Without loss of generality, let el = 0 and eh = 1.
Each adult with state x 2 X seeks to maximize (1) and faces budget constraint
c + b
0 + ¿e · !h(1 ¡ l) + ½b:
Thus, the choice set for an agent with state x is given by
¤(x) = f(c;l;e;b
0) : c + b
0 + ¿e · !h(1 ¡ l) + ½b;l 2 [0;1];e 2 E;b
0 ¸ 0g:
An adult's decision problem may be described by the following functional equation:
V (x) = max
(c;l;e;b0)2¤(x)
fuµ(c;l) + ¯E[V (x
0)jx;e]g: (2)
Let (gc(x);gl(x);ge(x);gb(x)) = argmax(c;l;e;b0)2¤(x)fuµ(c;l) + ¯E[V (x0)jx;e]g be the
policy functions associated with (2).
5This dynamic programming problem can also be written as follows,







fuµ(c;l) + ¯EelV (x
0)g
represents the father's expected discounted value of providing his son with low edu-




fuµ(c;l) + ¯EehV (x
0)g
denotes the associated value when high education is chosen. Expectation operator
Ee is understood to be taken conditional not only on e but also on x. Let ¤j(x) =
f(c;l;b0) : c + b0 + ¿j · !h(1 ¡ l) + ½b;l 2 [0;1];b0 ¸ 0g, j = f0;1g.
I now turn to the existence of a unique solution to (2). Before doing so, it is
necessary to settle some notation. De¯ne z = (h;µ) 2 Z, Z = H££. Let B0(z) = fb :
V 0(z;b) ¸ V 1(z;b)g and B1(z) = fb : V 0(z;b) < V 1(z;b)g. Let Ij(z;b), j = f0;1g,
be indicator functions taking value 1 if b 2 Bj(z) and 0 otherwise.

































Now, let C(X) be the space of bounded continuous functions V : X ! R, and let
T : C(X)2 ! C(X)2 be an operator de¯ned by
(TfV
0;V






















Moreover, de¯ne T nfV 0;V 1g = T(T n¡1fV 0;V 1g) for all n = f1;2;3;:::g.
Proposition 1 There exists unique solution fV 0(X);V 1(X)g 2 C(X)2 to (3)-(4)
and T nfV 0
0 ;V 1
0 g converges uniformly to fV 0;V 1g as n ! 1 from any fV 0
0 ;V 1
0 g 2
C(X)2. Both V 0(x) and V 1(x) are strictly increasing, strictly concave, and continu-
ously di®erentiable in b.
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 2 There exists a unique V (x) that solves (2).
Firm's problem. I consider a representative ¯rm that seeks to maximize pro¯ts.
This representative ¯rm solves the following optimization problem every period taking
the wage rate w as given,
max
N¸0
fY ¡ !Ng s.t. Y = F(N): (5)
6Equilibrium. I focus on stationary equilibrium. This notion of equilibrium re-
quires that parents never transfer wealth beyond some endogenously determined level
¹ b. Thus, the relevant state space is subset S ½ X, where S = H £££[0;¹ b]. Further-
more, this equilibrium concept is associated with a distribution of individuals across
states that remains unchanged over time. This distribution is given by a stationary
probability measure ¸ on (S;B), where B denotes the Borel sets of S. Station-
arity of probability measure ¸ means that for a well-de¯ned transition function P,




P(s;B)d¸(s); 8B 2 B:
The transition function P(s;B) can be thought as the probability that an individual
with state s 2 S will have a child whose state when adult lies in B. P(s;B) can be
found from transition matrices ¦e and ¡, and policy rules ge(s) and gb(s).
De¯nition 3 A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is a value function V (s),
a set of individuals' policy functions gc(s), gl(s), ge(s), and gb(s), ¯rm's labor demand
N, a wage rate !, and probability measure ¸ such that:
1. V solves (2) given ! with associated policy rules gc, gl, gs, and gb,
2. N solves the representative ¯rm's problem (5) given !, i.e., F 0(N) = !,
3. markets clears, i.e., N =
R
S(1 ¡ gl(s))d¸(s), and F(N) + ½
R
S b(s)d¸(s) = R
S(gc(s) + ¿ge(s) + gb(s))d¸(s), where b(s) = f~ b : s ´ (z;~ b) 2 Sg,
4. ¸ is a stationary probability measure.
Before stating the next proposition that gives conditions under which there exist
a stationary probability measure ¸, I need to establish some notation. Let M(S) be





P(s;B)d¸(s); 8B 2 B:
De¯ne W n+1¸ = W(W n¸) for all n = f1;2;3;:::g.
Proposition 4 If ½ < 1=¯, and ¼(¹ hj¹ h;e) ¸ ¼(¹ hjh;e) for all e 2 E and p(µhjµh) ¸
p(µhjµl), then there exists a unique stationary probability measure ¸ on (S;B), and
for any ¸0 2 M(S), W n¸0 converges weakly to ¸ as n ! 1.
Proof. It closely follows proof of Huggett's (1993) Theorem 2.
3 Empirical evidence
In this section I present and estimate a statistical model of intergenerational trans-
mission of the permanent component of work hours and leisure preferences. I show
evidence that reveals a strong positive correlation of hours and preferences across
generations. In addition, I report estimates on the intergenerational persistence of
wages, earnings and consumption.
73.1 Statistical model and estimation method
A number of popular statistical models to explore the transmission of economic status
across generations can be found in the literature. In this paper I adopt Zimmerman's
(1992) econometric speci¯cation. However, I pursue a di®erent estimation strategy
than he does.
In general, for any measure of the permanent component of economic status, the
basic problem is to uncover the parameter values of the following statistical model
relating father's and son's outcomes:
Yis = ® + ÃYif + ²is; (6)
where Yis (Yif) denotes a measure of family i son's (father's) permanent status and
²is is a white-noise error term. I am interested in the coe±cient Ã. The closer Ã is to
zero, the less the intergenerational persistence we observe.
Unfortunately, the permanent component of any measure of economic status or
any other variable of interest is not observable. What we do observe are their tran-
sitory realizations. I assume that a person's current realization, Yikt, is related to his
permanent component as follows,
Yikt = Yik + ±Xikt + ºikt; (7)
where Xikt are individual time-varying characteristics pertaining to person k = fs;fg
in family i in period t, and ºikt is a transitory error term.
The estimation strategy I pursue consists of two stages. First, I estimate equation
(7) separately for fathers and sons and obtain the ¯xed e®ect estimator as measure of
each individual's permanent component. In particular, the ¯rst-stage regression ¯ts
the log of the variable of interest using ¯xed e®ects and life-cycle variables such as age,
up to the fourth power, family size, and year dummies. The generated permanent
measures for all father-son pairs are then used to directly estimate equation (6).
This estimation, however, su®ers from an error-in-variables problem. Therefore, the
ordinary-least-square (OLS) estimator of Ã is downward biased.
I estimate this error-in-variables regression model by instrumenting the fathers'
permanent component. I proceed as follows. I ¯rst split each father's set of yearly
observations in half and form two subsamples.5 I then follow the estimation strategy
described above using fathers' ¯rst-half subsample and instrumenting fathers' perma-
nent component with the ¯xed-e®ect estimate of equation (7) using their second-half
subsample.6
3.2 Data description
I use data from the PSID, a yearly household survey begun in 1968, conducted by
the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. The PSID started with a
5That is assuming that all fathers have a even number of observations M. For M odd I assign
(M + 1)=2 to the \¯rst-half" subsample.
6I choose the fathers' ¯rst-half subsample as the baseline for my estimation because that makes
ages closer for father and son.
8core sample of approximately 4,800 households. Individuals from this original sample
have been traced whether or not they are living in the same household or with the
same people. The core sample of the PSID has two components. One is the Survey
Research Center (SRC) subsample which is representative of the U.S. households in
1968 and consists of nearly 3,000 families. The other component consists of about
1,900 low-income households sampled by the Census Bureau for the 1966-1967 Survey
of Economic Opportunity (SEO).7 I restrict my sample to the SRC component of the
PSID to avoid overrepresenting low-income families.
Since I focus on father-son correlations, I consider only male individuals who
belong to a sampled household at the time of the 1968 interview who were either
household heads or head's sons. The data are from all waves of the PSID until 2001
and only heads who were between the ages of 25 and 65 in any given year at the
moment of the interview are included. Thus, sons still living with their parents are
omitted regardless of their age. I also drop single-year observations with missing
hours worked, or with positive labor income and zero hours at the same time.8
For the analysis below, I consider the following key variables. I use the natural
logarithm of annual hours worked to investigate the intergenerational persistence of
work e®ort. To avoid excluding zero hours (approximately 6 percent of the sample)
from the analysis when taking logarithm, I essentially set them to 1 hour.9
The wage rate is hourly earnings, which is the ratio of annual labor income and
annual hours worked. Labor income as well as other monetary variables are all con-
verted into 1984 dollars using the GDP de°ator. Wages less than half the 1984 federal
minimum wage of 3.35 dollars and larger than 200 dollars where omitted. In the case
of zero hours when hourly earnings is not available, I set the wage rate equal to the
minimum wage earned by the corresponding individual (excluding the above extreme
values). The idea is that individuals who do not work should be willing to work at
least at the minimum wage they have ever earned. As in the case of work hours, I
consider the logarithm of wages in the discussion below.
Another important variable considered in this study is earnings. In particular I
am interested in the permanent component of log earnings. I de¯ne this variable as
the sum of the permanent components of log hours and log wages.
In my analysis I also need household consumption. Unfortunately, the PSID does
not contain direct measures for household or individual total consumption. However,
it does provide some components of it such as food consumption both at home and
away, the market value of owned homes, rent, utilities, and number of automobiles.
Using these data I construct a measure of household overall consumption based on
estimates provided by Skinner (1987). He ¯nds weights on di®erent components
of consumption available in the PSID by regressing total consumption on the same
consumption categories using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).
7See Hill (1992) for a detailed description of the PSID.
8Very few observations are thrown away because of this last requirement.
9More speci¯cally I approximate log(x) with log(x=2 +
p
(x=2)2 + 1). Note that for values of
x > 10 these two functions are basically identical. In my data base, except for very few observations,
positive hours are all larger than 10. Thus, this approximation is practically equivalent to setting
zero hours to 1.
9He estimates two sets of regressions coe±cients, one from the 1972-1973 CEX and the
other from 1983 CEX. Using his 1972-1973 baseline coe±cients, I then impute total
consumption data to all my PSID households.
Table 1 presents some summary statistics of the sample. It consists of 3,265
individuals and 48,208 single-year observations. From those individuals, 1,984 were
head of household and 1,281 were children in 1968. Only 748 heads in 1968 had
at least one son in my sample. Instead, almost all children in 1968 had their father
sampled. Thus, I obtain 1,200 father-son pairs which I use for the estimations below.10
3.3 Estimation results
In this section I present estimates for Ã in equation (6) following the estimation
strategy outlined in Subsection 3.1. Although I am mainly interested in the intergen-
erational persistence of work hours and preferences for leisure, I also report estimates
for the father-son correlation of wages, earnings and consumption. Furthermore, I
examine the relationship between human capital and education. Hereafter, I work
with the log of these variables.
Table 2 presents the second-stage estimates of the intergenerational persistence
Ã in (6). I report both OLS and IV estimates. In the case of the IV regression,
I exclude fathers with less than 8 observations in order to guarantee that each one
of them has at least 4 observations when estimating the ¯xed e®ect model (7) for
each half subsample. Besides regression coe±cients, I also report their Huber-White
standard errors and the number of both father-son pairs and fathers in each regres-
sion.11 A general observation from this table is that, as expected, OLS estimates are
signi¯cantly smaller than IV estimates presumably due to measurement error.
Earnings. The ¯rst row of Table 2 displays results for log earnings as de¯ned
above. These estimates show an elasticity of son's earnings with respect to parental
labor income lower than what has been reported in recent studies. For instance,
my IV estimate is 0.25. Instead, the most cited estimates lie in the neighborhood
of 0.4.12 Typically, these studies omit observations with zero earnings. In contrast,
my measure of permanent log earnings implicitly includes those observations. As
pointed out by Couch and Dunn (1997), it appears that such exclusion biases the
intergenerational persistence upward.
To explore that possibility, I follow my estimation strategy with the actual annual
labor income reported by individuals in my PSID data for two di®erent cases: (i)
excluding annual observations with zero earnings as in most of the previous studies,
and (ii) considering all (non-missing) observations.13 Results are shown in Table
3. Notice that the estimates when omitting zero earnings are much larger than their
10I also considered the full sample with all individuals regardless of whether 1968 heads have at
least one son or 1968 children have their father in the sample in the ¯rst-stage estimation of the
permanent component in equation (7). Results are essentially the same as the ones shown below.
11Standard errors need to be corrected because there are parents with more than one son in my
sample. Thus, residuals are not independent within a particular family.
12See, for example, Solon (1992), Zimmerman (1992), Bjorklund and Jantti (1997), among others.
For an extensive review on these estimates, see Solon (1999).
13In the second case, I approximate the log function with the same function used for work hours
10counterpart when using the whole sample; IV estimates are 0.44 and 0.27, respectively.
This seems to con¯rm that excluding zero earnings tends to increase the estimated
intergenerational persistence of earnings. The IV estimate of 0.44 is within the range
reported by other studies. In contrast, the IV estimate of 0.27 is signi¯cantly smaller
than the benchmark estimate found in the literature of 0.4. Also observe that the
latter estimate is close to the one reported in Table 2 of 0.25. Thus, the apparently low
intergenerational persistence estimated with my constructed measure of permanent
log earnings seems to be the result of considering observations with zero hours and
thereby no labor income.
Wages. I also report estimates of the father-son correlation of wages in Table 2.
Looking at the IV estimate, I ¯nd a persistence of the log hourly wage across gener-
ations of 0.41. This ¯gure is within the range found in the literature. Zimmerman
(1992), using data from the NLS, ¯nds an estimate of 0.39 when regressing sons' log
hourly wage in 1981 on a 4-year average of fathers' log hourly wage. Solon (1992)
provides an IV estimate of 0.45 for the persistence of log wages with intergenerational
data from the PSID. Mulligan (1997a) also reports estimates of this intergenerational
elasticity using the PSID. He ¯nds an estimate of 0.33 when regressing sons' log of
average hourly earnings on the same variable for fathers.
Hours. The results for the intergenerational persistence of work hours are shown
in the third row of Table 2. The OLS estimate is quite low, around 0.04. In contrast,
my IV estimate of 0.20 is signi¯cantly larger.
A comparable estimate found in the literature is the one by Altonji and Dunn
(1991). They regress time averages of the logarithm of annual work hours of sons on
time averages of the same variable for fathers using data from the NLS. Their OLS
and IV estimates are 0.095 and 0.19, respectively.
Couch and Dunn (1997) and Mulligan (1997b) also provide empirical evidence
on the intergenerational correlation of work hours using the PSID. The former, in a
comparative study between the U.S. and Germany, report a regression coe±cient of
0.14 when regressing single-year annual hours of work on six-year averages of fathers
annual hours (in levels), which is equivalent to a correlation of 0.19. Mulligan's
estimate is somewhat larger then my IV estimate. He reports a regression coe±cient
of 0.25 using average weekly work hours.
In general, my results are in line with other studies' ¯ndings. Namely, the signif-
icant and positive correlation between father's and son's hours worked.14
Table 4 contains IV estimates of Ã when variables indicating family characteristics
are included in the second-stage regression of equation (6). I consider race dummy
variables, number of brothers, number of parents living with the children, a dummy
variable indicating whether a child is the oldest son, and fathers' years of schooling.
The ¯rst column copies the results from Table 2. Column 2 shows the results when
including race dummy variables only. The coe±cient on the dummy variable for black
so that zero-earnings observations are not thrown away.
14If I exclude zero hours from the estimation, I obtain larger point estimates for the intergenera-
tional persistence of hours. The OLS estimate increases to 0.13, and the IV estimate slightly goes
up to 0.21. Couch and Dunn (1997) also ¯nd the same pattern when excluding observations with
zero hours.
11is signi¯cant and negative, indicating that black children tend to work somewhat less
hours. That appears not to be true for latinos and asians since the coe±cient on
their respective dummy variable although negative is not statistically di®erent from
zero. Race also has an e®ect on the intergenerational persistence of work hours. The
coe±cient on father's hours falls from 0.20 to 0.17. This suggests that the degree
of persistence across generations is explained partially by racial background. To
investigate further this issue, I estimate equation (6) for whites separately (results are
not shown in table). I ¯nd an intergenerational persistence of 0.25 (with a corrected
standard error of 0.127). For blacks only I obtain an estimate of 0.02 (0.185), which
is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero.15
In column 3, I included regressors related to family composition. Both the number
of brothers and whether a son is the oldest of all brothers seem not to matter at all.
Their coe±cients are not statistically di®erent from zero. Instead, whether a child
lived with two parents or only one has an e®ect on both the level of work hours of
sons and the persistence coe±cient. The latter falls slightly more when this variable is
added. When I estimate the intergenerational persistence conditional on the number
of parents, I obtain signi¯cantly di®erent results (not shown in table). In the case of
only one parent living with the child, I get an estimate of 0.29 (0.165). In the other
case, I ¯nd an estimate of 0.15 (0.079). Further research is needed to explain the
di®erence in the degree of intergenerational transmission when controlling for family
composition.
Results in column 4 show that fathers' years of schooling, as proxies for parental
income or economic status, has a positive e®ect on children work e®ort. It also
has a large negative impact on the persistence estimate. This suggests that the
intergenerational transmission of income associated with parental education level is
an important source of correlation of work hours across generations.
Summarizing the results, I ¯nd a signi¯cant link between work hours of fathers
and adult sons. My IV estimate indicates that this father-son correlation is around
0.20. Moreover, this seems to be partially explained by observable characteristics of
the parent or family unit where these children were raised.16
Consumption. The fourth row in Table 2 presents estimates of intergenerational
correlation of consumption. Using the logarithm of my measure of imputed consump-
tion explained above, I ¯nd that the intergenerational persistence is 0.71. When I
consider log of consumption adjusted by family size (not reported), the correlation is
about the same, around 0.73. Aughinbaugh (2000) and Mulligan (1997a) ¯nd similar
persistence across generations. They both use data from the PSID and impute con-
sumption to household using Skinner's (1987) estimated coe±cients. My estimates
are not directly comparable to theirs because they use the actual level of consump-
15I use 64 father-son pairs in this regression. The relatively small number of observations might
explain the high standard error on the father's hours coe±cient.
16In this paper, I do not explore the e®ect of the mother's labor market status on the son's status.
This, in principle, might have an impact but considering the very weak correlation found by Altonji
and Dunn (1991) between work hours of sons and mothers, I do not think that including mothers'
hours in the regression would signi¯cantly change the results reported here. However, more research
is needed to give a ¯nal answer regarding this issue.
12tion, not the log of it. However, the message is the same: consumption seems to
be considerably more persistent across generations than other measures of economic
status.
Leisure preferences. One reason why we observe a signi¯cant correlation of work
hours across generations might be because parents transmit their preferences for
leisure to their children. \Parents and children share genes and, for at least part
of their lives, live in the same environment. There is thus reason to suspect that their
preferences should be similar."17
Unfortunately, preferences are not directly observable. However, using my PSID
data I construct a proxy for the leisure taste parameter µ. Choices re°ect, at least
partially, preferences. In other words, choices reveal preferences. Consider the static







where ni ´ (1¡li) denotes work hours and wi ´ !hi is the hourly wage rate. Taking
logarithm on both sides of that expression and rearranging, it becomes
logµi = logwi ¡ ¾ logci + ° logni: (8)
Thus, with the previously estimated permanent component of log wages, work
hours and household consumption for each individual, I use equation (8) to generate
a proxy for the leisure parameter.18 I assume that ¾ = 1 and ° = ¡2, but consider
other parameter values for robustness. Estimates for ¾ in the literature range from
0.5 to 3. As for °, microeconometric studies have found an intertemporal elasticity
of labor supply, ¡1=°, between 0 and 0.6.19 Thus, both parameters take values
consistent with previous empirical ¯ndings.
I then use this measure of the leisure taste parameter to estimate the intergen-
erational model given by equation (6). The last row of Table 2 reports estimates of
the intergenerational correlation of leisure preferences. Judging from the IV results,
I ¯nd a strong persistence across generations of 0.29.
When I consider combinations of ¾ = f1;1:5;2g and ° = f¡4;¡3;¡2g instead,
IV estimates (shown in Table 5) remain in the neighborhood of 0.29. In fact, the nine
estimates average 0.293. This suggests that the observed strong correlation across
generations appears to be fairly robust within a reasonable range for ¾ and °.
Table 6 displays IV results when including some family background variables as
regressors. First notice that blacks seems to have higher preferences for leisure. This
may be explained by the fact that a higher fraction of Afro-Americans are under
the poverty line and thereby under some welfare program, which has been shown
to create disincentives to working. Moreover, adding race dummies decreases the
intergenerational persistence coe±cient from 0.29 to 0.23. As in the case of hours,
when I run di®erent regressions for whites and blacks, the former exhibit a much
larger preference persistence than the latter do (0.30 vs. 0.00). More research is
17Charles and Hurst (2003, p. 1173).
18Hall (1997) provides a similar derivation to study preference shifts in a business cycle framework.
19See, for example, Ghez and Becker (1975), MaCurdy (1981), and Altonji (1986).
13needed to investigate the robustness of this result given that the only-blacks estimate
is found with only 60 father-son pairs.
The family composition variables that I consider in the third column do not appear
to be important either for the level of µ or for its intergenerational correlation. But
fathers' years of schooling does have a signi¯cant impact. The negative regression
coe±cient on fathers' education might be caused by a number of reasons. One could
be self-selection. Individuals with high preferences for leisure tend to work less and,
therefore, have a lower rate of return on human capital investment when compared to
hard working people. Hence, they are inclined to acquire less education. Since leisure
preferences are correlated across generations less educated parents are more likely to
have relatively lazier children. Another reason could be that children's preferences
for leisure not only depend on parents' preferences but also depend on the actual
amount of hours worked by parents.20 Since more educated individuals tend to have
better wages and thereby work more, children of more educated parents observe them
working harder and end up having relatively less preferences for leisure or, in other
words, a higher willingness to work.
Human capital and education. Children's human capital is at least partially a
consequence of parents' choices. One of those decisions is how much to invest in
children education. As discussed in Section 2, that creates a link between father's
and son's human capital. Here I explore that relationship.
First notice that the permanent component of log wages may be interpreted as the
permanent level of human capital.21 When I include children's years of schooling in
(6) for log wages, the regression coe±cient on parental permanent log human capital
decreases dramatically. The same pattern arises when I include instead a dummy vari-
able indicating whether the child has a college degree (i.e. years of schooling greater
or equal than 16). This results suggest that around one fourth of the intergenerational
correlation of wages or human capital is due to parental college education investment
in children.
4 Calibration
As mentioned above, one of the main goals of this paper is to explain the observed
patterns in work hours, as well as in wages, earnings and consumption, across gen-
erations given the persistence of leisure tastes and the role of college education. I
20See Mulligan (1997b) for a more extensive illustration of this alternative channel of transmission.
21To see this, consider that each agent's wage w is the product of the e±ciency-unit wage rate,
!, which is constant across individuals, and her human capital measured in e±ciency units, h, (i.e.,
wit = !hit). Taking logarithm on both sides, I obtain logwit = log!+loghit. Furthermore, consider
that the life-cycle pro¯le of loghit is given by loghit = loghi+³Zit+eit, where hi denotes permanent
human capital, Zit represents a set of life-cycle characteristics, and eit is an error term. Combining
these two expressions, I get
logwit = log! + loghi + ³Zit + eit: (9)
Note that (9) and (7) are essentially identical. Hence, we can interpret the estimated ¯xed-e®ect
component in (7) for log wages as loghi.
14pursue this objective by simulating my model economy. To that end, I ¯rst need to
calibrate the model's parameters to the U.S. economy. The parameters are ¯, ¾, °, µl,
µh (preferences); ½ (technology); ¿ (schooling cost); h and ¹ h (human capital); ! and
Markov matrices ¦0, ¦1, and ¡ that govern the model's intergenerational uncertainty.
A priori information. I assume that individuals become adults at age 24, and die
at age 65 to match the most common retirement age. Considering an annual real
interest rate of 3 percent, the rate of return ½ is set to 2.03. Also, I normalize the
e±ciency-unit wage rate, !, to 1.
The child weight or intergenerational discount parameter, ¯, is set to 0.375 which
is equivalent to an annual discount factor of 0.96. As discussed in the previous Section
when describing my constructed proxy for µ, I set ¾ = 1 and ° = ¡2.22
Estimated and matched parameters. Labor productivity parameters h and ¹ h are
set to approximate the observed wage distribution found in the empirical section.
Furthermore, their transition probability matrices ¦0 and ¦1 are chosen to reproduce
the intergenerational correlation of wages conditional on the education level shown
in Table 7 in Subsection 3.3. In particular, I choose to match the process implied by
the IV estimation when controlling for whether the child gets a college degree (fourth
column in Table 7). To that end, I follow the method outlined by Tauchen (1986),












I proceed in similar fashion to pin down transition probabilities for the leisure
preferences parameter µ. That is, I take the estimated intergenerational correlation
of logµ (or more accurately, its constructed proxy) reported in Section 3 and, following







While the generated proxy for individuals' taste parameter is useful for estimating
its transition probabilities, it is not suitable for choosing parameters µl and µh because
in the model their value are implicitly associated with the time available for working,
which I normalize to 1. Thus, I set the average of logµ so that the model matches
the average fraction of time a person works during a period. I ¯nd that the average
person in my PSID data set works 2,089 hours annually. If we take the maximum to
be 4,160 hours (80 hours £ 52 weeks), the average individual works approximately




l(s))d¸(s) = 0:50: (10)
Another parameter that also has yet to be calibrated is the cost of college, ¿.
I set this parameter to match the fraction of 1968 children in my PSID data that
22In the sensitivity analysis below I consider other values for ¾ and °.
23I take as benchmark the IV estimation in the last row of Table 2.
24The maximum amount of 4,160 hours corresponds to the 99th percentile in my data.
15graduated from college. As shown in Table 1, that fraction is 0.30. Thus, I look for




e(s)d¸(s) = 0:30: (11)
Calibrating the preference parameters and the cost of higher education requires
solving the model and ¯nding its associated stationary distribution ¸(s) as implied
by equations (10) and (11). This yields logµl = 0:65, logµh = 4:08, and ¿ = 0:063.
Table 8 presents a summary of the calibrated parameters.
5 Simulation results
In this Section I examine the performance of the model in terms of its ability to
match the intergenerational correlation not only of work hours but also of wages,
earnings and consumption. A successful quantitative model should be able to repro-
duce simultaneously these statistics. To explore this I simulate 20,000 families for
three generations where each \grandfather" is drawn from the stationary equilibrium
distribution, and study the correlation of the second father-son pair in each family.
Intergenerational persistence is measured in the same way as in Section 3. Namely, I
regress the logarithm of sons' outcome on fathers' outcome. I also make some experi-
mental simulations to explore the importance of di®erent sources of intergenerational
persistence on work hours, wages, earnings and consumption. Table 9 reports the
simulation results.
Benchmark economy. The model predicts a intergenerational persistence coe±-
cient of hours of 0.21 versus 0.20 for the U.S., whereas for wages I obtain a coe±cient
of 0.42 versus 0.41 in the data. The predicted father-son consumption correlation
of 0.65, although falls short of my estimate of 0.71, is reasonably close to estimates
found in the literature.25 The persistence of earnings of 0.31 is slightly o® target com-
pared to my estimated correlation of 0.25. However, it is within the range between
my estimate and the highly cited correlation of 0.40. In general, it appears that the
benchmark model does a good job matching what we observe in the data. Especially
in the case of work hours and wages. The model is able to reproduce these facts even
though both productivity and the leisure preference parameter take only two possible
values each.
5.1 Alternative economies
A more standard economy. Here I look at an economy with no heterogeneity in pref-
erences. The idea of this exercise is to investigate the relevance of this particular
feature of the model. In other words, could a much simpler model explain the inter-
generational patterns observed in the data? Do we really need this heterogeneity in
order to reasonably match the U.S. data?
25Mulligan (1997a) reports an estimate of 0.68 for the U.S. See also Aughinbaugh (2000).
16To simplify further the exercise I abstract from educational investment. Thus, the
only two sources of intergenerational persistence are bequest and the innate trans-
mission of human capital across generations. The complete calibration of this simpler
model is shown in the Appendix. It is worth stressing that the a priori calibrated
parameters remain unchanged.
The simulation results of this economy are reported in the third row of Table 9.
The main observation from this exercise is that it appears that a model with ho-
mogeneous preferences for leisure is not capable of reproducing the strong positive
correlation of work hours across generations. In fact, the simulations reveal a sig-
ni¯cant negative relationship between fathers' and sons' work e®ort. The intuition
is simple. High wage individuals who work harder than average tend to have chil-
dren who take more leisure due to the negative bequest e®ect on labor supply which
dominates the positive e®ect coming from the strong persistence of wages.
The message from this exercise is clear. Leisure preference heterogeneity plays an
important role in explaining the intergenerational pattern observed in hours.
No education. Another similar question is whether modelling college investment
is a relevant characteristic of the model in order to explain the correlation of hours
and earnings across generations.
The fourth row in Table 9 presents the simulation results of the model abstract-
ing from college decisions.26 By design, the model is able to reproduce exactly the
persistence in wages. Work hours are slightly less correlated across generations than
what the benchmark model predicts, and earnings are signi¯cantly less persistent in
this economy relative to the baseline model. The intuition for these drops is that with
no college choice, a child's wage does not depend on the probability of being hard
worker. In other words, in the model without education investment, the persistence
of abilities and preference are completely independent. Instead, in the benchmark
model those two are related via college choice. For example, consider a parent en-
dowed with µl (i.e., high willingness to work). This individual is more likely to have
a µl child than a lazy parent is. Moreover, the rate of return of sending his child
to college is higher because this child is more likely to work more hours when adult.
Therefore, hard working parents who tend to have higher earnings, are more prone
to send their o®spring to college and, in consequence, have high earnings children.
This simpler economy with no education is capable of explaining most but not
all of the persistence in hours observed in the data. As for earnings, even though
it predicts less correlation than the benchmark model, its prediction is closer to
what I ¯nd in the empirical section. Nevertheless, it is farther away from the most
popular intergenerational persistence of 0.4 in the literature. Despite of this \lack"
of persistence in earnings, consumption correlation is within the range of estimates
found by other studies due to wealth transfers. I leave as an open question which
model, overall, gets closer to the data. However, if one wants to investigate the
contribution of higher education on the intergenerational transmission of economic
status or the impact of public policies on college education, the benchmark model is
clearly more suitable.
26Recalibration in the Appendix.
175.2 Experiments
Economy without persistence in preferences. To assess the role of the persistence in
leisure preferences across generations I return to my benchmark model and completely
shut down this channel by making such persistence zero (i.e., p(µ0jµ) = 1=2 for all
µ0;µ 2 £). In order to isolate the e®ect of preferences, I recalibrate ¿ = 0:058 in order
to satisfy (11). Notice, however, that when solving for the stationary equilibrium I
cannot completely isolate the impact of preference persistence because parents react
to this change by adjusting wealth transfers. For instance, hard working parents will
leave a larger bequest to insure their children against a bad preference shock which
is now more likely to occur.
The results of simulating this modi¯ed economy are shown in the ¯fth row of Table
9. First notice the counterfactual prediction of this model regarding work hours.
The correlation of hours becomes negative as in the case with no heterogeneity in
µ. It drops dramatically to -0.12 mainly because di®erences in work hours among
individuals are mostly driven by di®erences in preferences. Disparities in wages do
not play a leading role explaining discrepancies in work hours since the elasticity
of labor supply is not su±ciently large. Furthermore, the bequest e®ect mentioned
above reinforces the e®ect in hours. Hard working (lazy) parents tend to transfer
more (less) wealth than in the benchmark economy which causes their children to
work even less (more) hours for any type they end up drawing. I however ¯nd that
this bequest e®ect on hours correlation is small relative to the preference persistence
e®ect.27
This experiment also allows me to observe the impact of leisure preference per-
sistence on the intergenerational correlation of earnings. The latter signi¯cantly falls
from 0.31 to 0.08 due to the sharp decrease in the persistence of work e®ort. Note
that the intergenerational transmission of wages remains the same because both ¦e
and the college decision have not changed. Finally, the correlation in consumption
goes slightly down. This decrease is relatively small because wage correlation remains
unchanged and wealth level persistence is still very strong due to intergenerational
transfers.
Economy without college choice. I can also investigate the contribution of the
transmission of wages across generations on the correlation of work hours, earnings
and consumption. In the case of wages, there are two sources of persistence in the
model: the endogenous educational choice and the exogenous transmission of abili-
ties.28 I can actually study their e®ects on their own and together.
I ¯rst focus on the contribution of college. To explore this issue I make college a
27One way to control for changes in wealth transfers is by simulating the modi¯ed economy and
forcing parents to make transfers as if they were in the benchmark economy. Then I compare
the simulated correlations and any di®erence is attributed to bequest e®ects. When I run such
experiment I ¯nd that hours correlation is instead -0.08 and earnings persistence is 0.08. Thus, it
appears that the impact of adjusting bequest is sizable.
28By exogenous I mean in the model. Remember that I do not attempt to model how this type
of intergenerational transmission takes place. This exogenous persistence may depend on genetic
factors, nurture, and parental investment in early education as shown by Restuccia and Urrutia
(2004).
18complete random outcome which parents cannot a®ect at all. In particular, each child
has a probability of 0.3 to receive a college degree so that condition (11) holds. Notice
that this experiment is di®erent from the exercise where I abstract from education
altogether. The sixth row in Table 9 presents the results. Given the evidence in
Subsection 3.3, we should expect a fall in the father-son correlation of wages. That is
indeed what I ¯nd in this exercise. It decreases from 0.42 in the benchmark calibration
to 0.31.
I ¯nd a rather small drop in the persistence of work hours consistent with the
observation made above regarding di®erences in hours being mostly explained by dif-
ferences in leisure taste. The transmission of earnings and consumption also weakens
mainly driven by the reduction of the wage correlation.
The intuition for this fall in the intergenerational persistence of all the relevant
variables is somewhat similar to the one for the economy with no education. That is,
wages and preferences are completely independent. In this case, children who receive
higher education are not necessarily those who are more likely to be high ability type
and/or hard working individuals since college is randomly assigned. Those children
who are more likely to draw ¹ h and/or µl are precisely the o®spring of parents that
tend to have higher wages and earnings, and work more hours. If these parents were
allowed to provide their children with higher education, the latter would also tend to
have higher wages, work longer hours and, therefore, earn a higher income.
Economy with no exogenous persistence of ability. Now I turn to the case when I
shut down the exogenous persistence of human capital. In this case, the probability
of being high or low ability individual only hinges on the college decision and so I












As in the ¯rst experiment, I adjust ¿ = 0:061 so that calibration target (11) is still
met.
The results indicate that the persistence in wages is mainly driven by the model's
exogenous transmission of ability mechanism. Now the persistence in wages falls
much further, to 0.06. The same pattern emerges for the father-son correlation of
earning which drops to 0.13. Considering that the exogenous transmission of human
capital depends not only on natural elements and nurture but also on investment
in early education, it is reasonable to ¯nd a much substantial contribution of these
\exogenous" factors to the persistence of wages and earnings relative to the impor-
tance of college education. In fact, Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) show that parental
investment in early education accounts for most of the intergenerational persistence
of earnings attributed to total investment in education, which they split in two: early
and college education.
As in the previous experiment, the correlation of work hours do not change sub-
stantially for the same argument as before: hours persistence mostly re°ects pref-
erence persistence. Regarding consumption, it is now slightly less correlated across
generations due to the sharp fall in the transmission of earnings.
19Economy without wage persistence. Another experiment to further explore the
importance of the intergenerational transmission of human capital is to combine the
last two exercises. That is, I shut down the exogenous persistence in ability and
simultaneously randomize college education. By design, wages of parents and children
are not correlated at all. As expected, work hours are now much less persistent across
generations than when only one source of wage correlation is turned o®. However, they
remain signi¯cantly positive correlated since the leisure taste parameter still displays
the same intergenerational persistence as in the benchmark case. This suggests that
the transmission of preferences from parents to children is a fundamental source of
persistence of work e®ort, much more important than the intergenerational wage
transmission. The persistence of earnings becomes counterfactually almost zero, 0.02,
fundamentally because of the nonexistent father-son correlation of wages.
It is worth noting that in this experiment, as well as in the case of the model with-
out college choice or exogenous ability persistence, adjustments in bequest relative
to the benchmark economy do not play any role in explaining changes in intergener-
ational correlations. For instance, when I control for bequest changes (see footnote
27), hours and earnings persistence remain almost unchanged (0.15 and 0.03, respec-
tively). In other words, variations in the degree of transmission of hours and earnings
due to changes in the persistence of wages are explained almost not at all by the
ability of parents to adjust their transfers given the new environment.
Economy without intergenerational transfers. In this experiment I look at the
e®ect of wealth transfers across generations. To this end I make ½ su±ciently low so
that no parent ¯nds it optimal to leave a bequest. Again, ¿ must be recalibrated to
satisfy (11), so I set it to 0.053. Notice especially that the correlation of work hours
notably increases since the negative e®ect of bequest on hours no longer exists. That
is, high-earning parents do not discourage their children from working by transferring
wealth to them. Consequently, earnings are more persistent in this case. Furthermore,
since parents are unable to smooth consumption across generations by transferring
wealth, the correlation of consumption is much weaker than in economies with the
possibility of bequeathing, and is basically determined by the persistence of earnings.
This indicates that intergenerational wealth transfers, either inter vivos transfers or
bequest, are an important source of transmission of economic status from parents to
children.
Economies with only one source of intergenerational persistence. The last ¯ve
rows in the last panel of Table 9 present the results of simulations where, as opposed
to previous exercises, I only \activate" one source of persistence across generations.
For example, in the ¯rst experiment where I only consider preference correlation, be-
queathing is not allowed, college education is randomly assigned, and the persistence
of innate abilities is shut down. These exercises are another way of assessing the
contribution of each source of intergenerational correlation to similarities in hours,
wages, and earnings between fathers and sons. In general, the interpretation of these
results is the same as in the case of the previous experiments.
205.3 Further Discussion
Hours. The set of results summarized in Table 9 reveals that preference persistence is
a fundamental channel to explain the observed intergenerational correlation of work
hours. Once such persistence is removed from the model, it counterfactually predicts
that children of hard working parents tend to work much less. The last group of ex-
periments also points in the same direction. Notice that the only source of persistence
that is capable of producing on its own a signi¯cant degree of positive correlation in
hours is the leisure preference persistence. As far as hours correlation is concerned,
the contribution of innate or exogenous correlation of abilities across generations, and
college education are about the same. In general, similarities of wages between fathers
and sons account for a sizable fraction of the similarities of hours. However, they do
not seem to be nearly as important as preferences transmission. Wealth transfers, as
opposed to the other sources of intergenerational correlation study here, dampen the
positive correlation of work e®ort as one could expect.
Wages. In line with the ¯ndings of Restuccia and Urrutia (2004), the simulation
results show that the model's exogenous persistence of ability is much more impor-
tant than college education to account for the persistence of wages. When I turn o®
the former intergenerational linkage, wages transmission is much weaker than when
college education is no longer a choice (randomized to be precise). The same conclu-
sion may be drawn looking at last set of experiments (last panel of Table 9). This
result is nevertheless a direct consequence of my calibration strategy. Recall that
the calibrated stochastic process for ability reproduces the observed intergenerational
persistence of wages conditional on college choice. Moreover, I also seek to match
the fraction of children going to college. Therefore, the simulation of the baseline
model must be consistent with the empirical ¯ndings suggesting that around 3/4 of
the correlations of wages is accounted for by factors di®erent from higher education
investment.
Earnings. The similarity of earnings along family lines are mostly explained by
the persistence of wages across generations. Notice that when I shut down this chan-
nel, earnings exhibit almost no correlation. Instead, the lack of preference persis-
tence, even though it has a considerable impact on earnings dynamics, is not able
to completely o®set the e®ect of wage correlation. Again, looking at the last set of
experiments, the same observation emerges. If I only allow for wage correlation in
the model the persistence of earnings is much larger than when only preferences or
transfers are the only intergenerational linkage.
6 Sensitivity analysis
This section analyzes the sensitivity of the simulation results to changes in the cal-
ibrated parameters ¾ and °. In particular, I consider values for the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution of 2/3 and 0.5 (¾ equal to 1.5 and 2, respectively), and for
the compensated labor supply elasticity of 0.25 and 1/3 (° equal to -4 and -3). As
discussed in Subsection 3.3, these parameter values are within a reasonable range
21according to previous studies.
Changing any of these two parameters requires recalibrating ¡, µ and ¿ given the
same strategy described in Section 4. The transition matrix ¡ is calibrated to match
the estimated intergenerational persistence of logµ found in Subsection 3.3 for the
corresponding values of ¾ and ° (see Table 5). Moreover, µl, µh and ¿ are set so that
the stationary equilibrium satis¯es conditions (10) and (11).
Table 10 reports the results of simulating the alternative calibrated models for
di®erent combinations of ¾ and °. The intergenerational correlation of key variables
like hours, wages and earnings are very similar to those found using the benchmark
calibration except for the case of ¾ = 2 and ° = ¡2, and in a lesser extent for ¾ = 1:5
and ° = ¡2, and ¾ = 2 and ° = ¡3. For those cases the intergenerational correlation
of hours is higher due to a larger persistence in the leisure preference parameter as
Table 5 shows. As expected, the correlation in hours is increasing in the persistence
of preferences.
The persistence in consumption depends greatly on ¾. For those cases with identi-
cal intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the correlations in consumption are quite
close. Also notice that the larger the ¾, the stronger the linkage in consumption
across generation since parents with a lower intertemporal elasticity of substitution
are more willing to transfer wealth to their children. In general, my estimate of the
intergenerational persistence of consumption of 0.71 in the U.S. falls within the range
found in these exercises (from 0.65 to 0.79).
The sensitivity analysis with respect to ¾ and ° suggests that the ¯ndings obtained
in the previous section are reasonably robust to changes in these two important pa-
rameters. For only one case, the model yields signi¯cantly di®erent quantitative
results.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper I ¯nd a signi¯cant intergenerational persistence of work hours. My
estimates indicate that this correlation is around 0.20, which is close to what has
been found in previous studies.
This result di®ers from what a relatively standard model with intergenerational
linkages would predict. In particular, a model with only wealth transfers and (real-
istic) wage correlation across generations cannot reproduce the observed pattern in
hours. This paper shows that one needs to consider not only heterogeneity, but also
intergenerational persistence in leisure preferences in order to explain the correlation
of work e®ort across generations. The importance of the transmission of taste for
work is evident when shutting down the correlation in preferences in the benchmark
economy. In that case, the model counterfactually predicts a negative persistence in
hours. Moreover, similarities in work preferences along family lines appear to be more
important than the correlation of wages in order to account for the intergenerational
dynamics of work hours.
One of my objectives was to investigate whether the relation between economic
success of fathers and sons was due to the intergenerational persistence of work e®ort
22or wages. I ¯nd that the father-son correlation of earnings also depends importantly
on the transmission of work ethic within a family. For instance, when the preference
persistence is shut down, persistence of earnings across generations signi¯cantly goes
down from 0.31 in the baseline model to 0.08. Even though preferences play a deter-
minant role in the earnings dynamics, the intergenerational linkage of wages seems to
account for a larger fraction of the earnings correlation. When the former is turned
o®, the latter falls to 0.02. If one looks at consumption as a measure of economic
status, the same message emerges.
A question that comes up from these results is: What are their implications for
public policies? To give a satisfactory answer to that question, one ¯rst must establish
whether the transmission of work ethic from parent to children depends on the actual
hours worked by the former. Further research is needed to investigate these issues.
That would be, in my opinion, a natural extension of this paper.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let us show that T satis¯es the Blackwell's su±ciency conditions. Let W 0(x) ¸ V 0(x)








1 ) as the maximizers

















































































































Hence, (TfW 0;W 1g)(x) ¸ (TfV 0;V 1g)(x) (i.e., monotonicity).






















































































Since ¯ 2 (0;1), discounting has also been established. Therefore, the operator T is a
contraction. Then, the ¯rst part of Theorem follows from the Contraction Mapping
Theorem.
The remaining of the proof comes directly from standard results in dynamic pro-
gramming theory. ¥
A.2 Recalibration of alternative models
As mentioned above, the a priori calibrated parameter stay as in the benchmark
model. Since there is no college choice ¿ becomes irrelevant. For the same reason,
there is only one transition matrix ¦ describing the stochastic process followed by h.
This Markov matrix is chosen so that wages reproduce the intergenerational persis-
tence of 0.41 observed in the data. Again, I follow Tauchen's (1986) method to ¯nd







In the case of the model with no leisure preference heterogeneity I only need to
choose one parameter µ. I set this parameter so that condition (10) regarding the
number of hours worked by an average individual is satis¯ed in equilibrium. Thus,
µ = 7:03. For the economy with no college, µl, µh, and ¡ remain the same as in the
baseline calibration.
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26Table 1: Sample summary
Variable All 1968 Heads 1968 Children Fathers Sons
Observations 48,208 30,309 17,899 15,642 17,064
Individuals 3,265 1,984 1,281 748 1,200
Age 42.4 42.3 33.7 48.5 33.6
(11.4) (10.4) (7.0) (9.5) (6.9)
Education (yrs.) 12.9 12.4 13.8 12.3 13.8
(2.9) (3.1) (2.3) (3.1) (2.26)
College graduate .23 .19 .30 .20 .30
Work hours 2,089 2,042 2,170 2,041 2,183
(842) (905) (715) (911) (704)
Wage 13.0 13.2 12.7 13.6 12.8
(1984 dollars) (10.6) (10.6) (10.7) (10.8) (10.7)
Labor income 26,404 26,126 26,873 27,154 27,108
(1984 dollars) (26,032) (26,107) (25,898) (28,162) (26,285)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
27Table 2: Estimates of Ã for di®erent variables
















Notes: Huber-White standard errors in parentheses
Number of father-son pairs and fathers in brackets.
28Table 3: Estimates of Ã for log earnings
Samples used in the ¯rst-stage estimation
Excluding zero earnings All observations
OLS IV OLS IV
.28 .44 .09 .27
(.043) (.082) (.027) (.093)
[1173;728] [1030;638] [1192;742] [1075;664]
Notes: Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.
Number of father-son pairs and fathers in brackets.
29Table 4: IV estimates for the father-son persistence of log work hours
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Father's log hours .200 .167 .151 .117
(.100) (.098) (.065) (.061)
Non-white/black -.226 -.149 -.145
(.252) (.153) (.155)
Black -.347 -.373 -.337
(.158) (.157) (.153)
Number of .000 .004
brothers (.021) (.021)
Number of .098 .117
parents (.048) (.046)




Constant .008 .034 -.102 -.352
(.026) (.025) (.096) (.165)
Note: Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.
30Table 5: IV estimates of the father-son persistence of
logµ for di®erent values of ¾ and °
°
¾ -4 -3 -2
1 .260 .270 .288
(.104) (.103) (.099)
1.5 .274 .288 .315
(.105) (.104) (.101)
2 .289 .309 .345
(.106) (.105) (.102)
Note: Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.
31Table 6: IV estimates for the father-son persistence of logµ
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Father's log hours .288 .228 .245 .198
(.099) (.091) (.096) (.086)
Non-white/black -.002 .219 .220
(.259) (.311) (.312)
Black .884 .868 .792
(.325) (.326) (.315)
Number of .003 -.002
brothers (.050) (.049)
Number of -.117 -.160
parents (.099) (.096)




Constant -.030 -.079 .144 .690
(.045) (.043) (.211) (.343)
Note: Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.
32Table 7: Intergenerational persistence of permanent log wage and education
Regressor OLS IV OLS IV
Parental log .216 .278 .252 .316
human capital (.031) (.036) (.033) (.049)
Child's years .075 .072
of schooling (.007) (.008)
Whether .302 .292
college degree (.033) (.036)
Constant -1.06 -1.02 -.134 -.138
(.100) (.113) (.017) (.018)
Note: Huber-White standard error in parentheses.
33Table 8: Calibrated parameter values for the U.S. economy
Parameter Value Source or target
¯ 0.375 A priori information
¾ 1 A priori information
° ¡2 A priori information
½ 2:03 3% annual interest rate
! 1 Normalization
h 0:53 Own estimation
¹ h 1:64 Own estimation
E(logµ) 2:36 Average time spent
working (PSID)
logµl 0:65 Own estimation
logµh 4:08 Own estimation
¿ 0:063 Fraction of children
with college degree (PSID)
34Table 9: Simulation results
Intergenerational correlation
Economy Hours Wages Earnings Consumption
U.S. data¤ 0.20 0.41 0.25 0.71
Benchmark model .21 .42 .31 .65
Alternative model economies:
Standard¤¤ -.09 .41 .31 .60
No education .18 .41 .23 .63
Economies without the following source of persistence:
Preference persistence -.12 .42 .08 .60
College choice .18 .31 .19 .61
Exogen. ability persist. .19 .06 .13 .60
Human cap. persistence .15 .00 .02 .56
Bequest .30 .42 .42 .41
Economies with only the following source of persistence:
Bequest -.10 .00 -.12 .49
Preference persist. .29 .00 .13 .13
College choice .03 .13 .15 .13
Exogen.-ability persist. .00 .31 .15 .15
Human cap. persistence .02 .42 .29 .27
¤ Figures taken from the fourth column in Table 2.
¤¤ Considers only exogenous ability persistence and bequest.
35Table 10: Sensitivity analysis
Intergenerational correlation
Economy Hours Wages Earnings Consumption
Benchmark .206 .424 .306 .654
(¾ = 1, ° = ¡2)
Alternative parameter values:
¾ = 1, ° = ¡3 .206 .411 .317 .651
¾ = 1, ° = ¡4 .201 .420 .319 .656
¾ = 1:5, ° = ¡2 .226 .356 .251 .722
¾ = 1:5, ° = ¡3 .206 .403 .291 .745
¾ = 1:5, ° = ¡4 .209 .415 .305 .748
¾ = 2, ° = ¡2 .287 .315 .274 .793
¾ = 2, ° = ¡3 .238 .369 .273 .789
¾ = 2, ° = ¡4 .219 .410 .291 .799
36